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ECONOMICS IN CULTURE VS. CULTURE IN ECONOMICS 
Limits and possibilities of a» scientific approach





purpose of this paper is to present a critical overview of 
economic theories of the functioning, financing and 
of the cultural sector. To which extent should and 
can economic approaches analyze, explain and predict cultural 
development, production and distribution.
By culture, a slippery concept, I mean symbolic works produced 
in formally organized sectors of the economy, i.e. materials 
produced for an audience and distributed through established 
channels. In other words, I refer to institutionalized culture,
i.e. the forms of culture that are supported, produced and 
distributed while resorting to formal organizations or markets. 
Within the domain of institutionalized culture, the focus mainly 
lies on the arts in the broad sense of the word.
The paper is divided into three main sections:
1. The relationship between economics and culture: two main
categories of economic theory claiming to have some explanatory 
power: the economics of culture and the cultural economics. By
comparing both approaches we will end by proposing some 
complementary research programmes.
2. The support for culture: we try to present the different 
economic rationales put forward to explain government 
intervention in the cultural sector (extrinsic vs. intrinsic 
arguments). None seem to provide the ultimate and sufficient 
reason; we need to go further than purely economic thinking to 
find satisfactory solutions.
3. The organization of the production and distribution of 
culture; we deal with two questions:
a. How can the varying prevalence of the nonprofit organization 
in the production and distribution of culture be explained?
b. what will be the behavioural consequences if cultural 
organizations are nonprofit as opposed to profit-seeking?
t European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, NL
This paper was written while the author was a Jean Monnet Fellow 
at the European University Institute during the academic year 
1988-89. For valuable discussions and comments I am grateful to 






















































































































































































I- Culture and Economy: cultural economics and the economics o-f 
culture
Of what can an economic approach o-f culture consist? Admitting 
that it is possible to observe cultural phenomena -from an 
economic point o-f view does not yet signi-fy that an economics o-f 
culture exists. In the absence of a definition of culture, (the 
debate should always remain open) the economist often reduces the 
field of investigation to a specific cultural field. It is not by 
accident that a more scientific approach of the relationship 
between culture and economy started with studies and analyses of 
well-circumscribed specific sectors. The scientific interest in 
culture originated from the field of arts, in particular the live 
performing arts. Still, the heterogeneity of the field, the 
diversity of the products and the logic of production often seem 
to indicate a variety of economics of cultural sectors with few 
common characteristics.
In social evolution, 
emerged in the late 
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of economic phenomena, 
economic profession 
was a continuous 
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economics lost its original sense o-f culture and became an 
abstraction -free o-f culture.
Not all schools of Western economic thought lost sight of the 
role of culture. One school which maintained a link with culture 
was institutional economics. It includes the work of American 
economists such as John R. Commons, Torstein Veblen, Wesley 
Mitchell, and Clarence Ayres, and the work of European economists 
(sociologists) such as Max Weber, Sidney and Beatrice Webb, and 
especially Joseph Schumpeter whose work stressed the influence of 
class, technological change and institutional setting on economic 
behaviour. According to institutionalists, economic behaviour is 
subject to the cultural and legal context of a given country and 
a specific period of history.
The impact of the institutionalist tradition has contributed to a 
contemporary split between what is called cultural economics and 
the economics of culture. Both are necessary for a complete 
economic appreciation of reality. Cultural economics is the study 
of the evolutionary influence of cultural differences on economic 
thought and behaviour. Accordingly, cultural economics assumes 
that economic behaviour varies according to the cultural context. 
The seminal and leading exponent of transdiscip1inary, 




























































































The economics of culture, on the other hand, is the study of the 
allocation of scarce resources within the cultural sector. It 
assumes that objective laws apply to economic behaviour not 
taking into account cultural differences. It places emphasis on 
the "scientific" or absolute nature of economics and on the 
application of abstract mathematical technique. The seminal and 
leading exponent of the positivist economics of culture is 
William Baumol (Baumol and Bowen, 1966).
The arts have caused almost as many difficulties for conventional 
economics and institutional economics as religion has. Even the 
mere idea of the penetration of hallowed regions of human 
endeavour by economists is often met with much scepticism. 
Efforts in recent years to establish and sustain economic 
analysis of matters associated with the arts, as represented by 
the work found in the Journal of Cultural Economics, appear 
to largely follow Baumol by applying conceptual and analytical 
tools from the inventory provided by conventional economics. 
Important insights have been and can continue to be secured from 
this approach.
In the following we tend to present an illustrative and 
necessarily incomplete survey of the treatment of culture in 
economics and some suggestions for possible associations between 
them in the form of complementary research programmes 




























































































Only since the late sixties conventional economics started to 
pay attention to the arts, in particular to the arts industries. 
This partly resulted from a renewed general interest in the arts, 
partly, probably from subtle changes in some economists’ thoughts 
about the relative contribution of the arts to well-being in 
affluent societies, and partly from the eagerness of economists 
to apply their tools to hitherto untried areas and from the fact 
that arts administrators started recognizing the increasing 
economic pressures of the arts.
The economics of culture originated in a context of crisis, in a 
response to a social demand. About twenty years ago the 
professors Baumol and Bowen wrote a far-reaching report on the 
economics of the performing arts in the USA, "Performing Arts: 
the Economic Dilemma". The study was commissioned by the Ford 
Foundation in order to prove the necessary intervention of public 
authorities in the sector of the performing arts and, 
subsequently, to indicate the need for subsidies from the federal 
government.
The results of the economic analysis were rather pessimistic 
about the viability of the performing arts in the long run. The 
problem is not only a financial one, but also concerns the 
efficiency and productivity of life performing arts organizations 
in a world of change and growth. These organizations, whether 




























































































ever-increasing production costs. The tendency of costs to rise 
and of prices to lag behind is said to be an inescapable result 
of the technology of live performance. According to Baumol and 
Bowen the crisis will aggravate if no permanent solution is found 
to finance the deficit. The study played a significant role in 
the creation of the National Endowment of the Arts in the USA.
Also in Europe, against the background of economic budgetary 
constraints and policy changes, the concepts and analytical 
approaches of conventional economics have become important in 
contemporary discussions on public support of the arts, 
alternative public arts policies and arts administrati on. 
Financial problems in most European opera and theatre houses 
only strengthens the topicality of Baumol’s approach.
A second explanation for the emergence and recognition of the 
economics of culture lies in the evolution itself of the economic 
science. In effect, economics with the recent developments in 
micro-economic analysis (e.g. the theory of time allocation, the 
new theory of the consumer) is going beyond its traditional 
formal framework. The intellectual imperialism of economists is 
one of the phenomena of our time;. economics seen as a special 
case of a much more general "logic of rational action". Do 
the economics of marriage, or the economics of crime not already 




























































































What has emerged are economics of the arts, (i.e. an economic 
analysis of demand and supply characteristics of various art 
industries), economics in the arts (analysis of resource 
allocation decisions in arts administrati on), and economics for 
the arts (analysis of the case for public support, the efficiency 
of: various levels and types of support, etc.). Analysts have 
drawn on consumption, production, industrial organization and 
welfare theories, as well as on other concepts in the 
conventional inventory. The perspectives, analytical tools and 
empirical approaches of conventional economics have proved useful 
in providing insight into a number of matters.
Baumol analyzes the economic problems of the performing arts at a 
micro—economic level and in a perspective of economic dynamism. 
He imagines an economy with a growing disparity between a modern 
sector characterized by an increasing labour productivity and a 
traditional sector characterized by a constant labour 
productivity. The place of an activity in one of the two sectors 
is determined by its technology and its labour input. In some 
cases, labour is only a means in the production or an instrument 
intervening in the final product. In other types of production 
labour is an essential element of the product and constitutes an 
end in itself. It means that a reduction in labour input finally 
diminishes the quality of the product with an obvious impact on 
its consumption. Baumol verified this two-sector model, amply 




























































































case of the live performing arts., i.e. theatre, opera, music and 
dance.
Because of its specific technology live performing arts cannot 
fully benefit from productivity gains resulting from new 
technology, an increasing capital stock, a better-educated labour 
force or economies of large-scale production. It can never reach 
the growth rates in productivity achieved by the economy as a 
whole. Today, playing an instrument or acting is still largely 
what it has been for centuries. From an engineering point of 
view, live performance is technologically stagnant. A fundamental 
characteristic of live performance is that the work of the 
performer is an end in itself, not a means to produce some good. 
The performer's activity is the consumer good which the audience 
purchases.
The immediate result of this technological di 
life performance and the typical manufacturing 
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The limits to technological improvement which characterize the 
live performing arts affect their costs of operation. The 
interrelationships of the various sectors of the economy, 
together with the inability of the arts to achieve a sustained 
increase in productivity, make ever-increasing costs an 
inevitable characteristic of live performance. Differential rates 
of growth in productivity within the economy imply for the 
relative costs of its various outputs.
The explanations by Baumol are fundamental for the analysis of an 
industrial society in which progress is measured in quantitative 
terms and in which free market competition functions without much 
intervention. However, in a post-industrial society with its 
growing service economy, the preponderance of the production of 
"non-productive" goods and services tends to change the rules of 
competition, which are put in quantitative and financial terms 
into new rules based on qualitative and political terms. 
Moreover, such a society is characterized by an increasing 
intervention of a variety of elements which are alien to the 
logic of the market economy (i.e. the state, donor foundations, 
sponsorship etc.). In view of changes in tastes and preferences 
of individuals and the state, it might eventually lead to a 
rather stable production level of the performing arts sector. 
Summarizing, the economic dilemma of Baumol is clearly set in a 
free market economy, whereas the survival of the performing arts



























































































more complex setting o-F variables. Still, in most countries the 
phenomena o-f industrial society dominate the economic life of the 
performing arts.
Many consider the arts as something different from the goods and 
services on the market-place and as something which is not 
easy to apply to the laws of economic science. Sometimes the 
concepts and analysis of the conventional economics approach can 
be applied more neatly and less ambiguously to activities other 
than the arts. Moreover, we should be very careful not to fall 
into the trap of systematic quantification for the mere sake of 
evaluating the economic importance of cultural activities, and 
more generally, of a meaningless application of a scientific 
(economic) approach beyond its conceptual limits.
B. Institutional Ec
1. Institutional 
to define as art. 
grouping of schol 
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As, until recently, was the case with conventional economics, 
institutional economics have concentrated on matters other than 
the arts. Their -focal point o-f interest is the interdependence 
between culture and economy, considered as more or less 
simultaneous mutual determinants.
The arts and the cultural patterns o-f a society reflect tastes 
and functions. In a culture structured in a hierarchical manner, 
belonging to a social rank prescribes tastes largely through 
emulation among its members and proscribes them through strong or 
weak sanction for non-members. These arts and cultural life 
styles serve as stabilizers in patterns of societal organization. 
Moreover, the tastes and views involved determine an important 
portion of the alternatives considered and the criteria used by 
the various decisi on-makers in the economy and contribute to the 
determination of responses to the basic questions concerning 
alloction of what, how, where, and when.
There are at least three major interrelated problems with the 
institutionalist approach to the arts:
a. How do artistic circumstances and changes interrelate 
with others in societal dynamics?
b. If creativity in the arts has different relationships with 
economic processes than other areas of creativity, what are these 
relationships?
c. What identifies human progress, what is social value, and how 




























































































Summarizing, the institutionalist approach is much larger as -far 
as its concept and analysis is concerned and cannot be easily 
reduced to quantitative magnitudes such as the conventional 
economic analysis with its limited purposes.
2. Neo-institutional economics designates a broad category which 
covers those contemporary economists who share the view that 
economic analysis should encompass an understanding and 
explanation of economic circumstances and processes in the 
context of the societal dynamics in which they arise. Galbraith 
predicted in 1973 that "over a longer period of time the arts and 
products that reflect artistic accomplishment will be 
increasingly central to economic development".
In some of the work of the neo-institutionalists, conceptions of 
man and society are being redefined and articulated in a manner 
which suggests different perspectives regarding the problems 
encountered in both conventional and institutional economics. 
In 197S Kenneth Boulding published his book "Ecodynamics: A New 
Theory of Societal Evolution" where he sketched out "at least an 
approximation of a general system of the universe based on a 
synthesis of the contributions of many sciences". It is a general 
system of evolution. The work contains ideas which appear 
promising in their potential for a different but complementary 
approach to gaining insights into the arts in the economy and in



























































































C. Economics and the Arts: complementary research programmes
There are significant differences between the conventional and 
the institutionalist approaches in such matters as initial 
assumptions, perspectives, and methods. Still, it will be 
possible to perceive these differences as complementary, if it 
is recognized that the two approaches raise different questions 
and pursue them in different contexts, that both sets of 
questions are important, and that both contexts are of 
fundamental importance to social science.
Conventional analysis begins with existing preferences ("values") 
and institutional structures and studies their efficiency by 
using the relative value theory, in which the subjective values 
of decision-makers are transformed, on account of the choices 
made, into objective evidence of relative value magnitudes. On 
the basis of these indicators of preference structure, 
alternative changes in institutional arrangements can be 
evaluated for private or public policy purposes.
□n the other hand, many institutional scholars consider a study 
on how existing values and preferences and institutional 
structures (beliefs and behavioural patterns) evolved, as a 
prerequisite to understanding contemporary economic arrangements 





























































































The main purposes o-f both approaches are the same: to obtain a 
better understanding o-f economic processes and to identify the 
choices and characteristics of the decision-making process 
most likely to lead to increases in human welfare. Since the 
questions differ, the research programmes differ as regards their 
contexts, approaches and methods, and foci.
In a sense, each approach begins at a different stage in the 
circular dynamics of economic processes. Conventional economics 
emphasizes the notion that an understanding of individual units 
and individual actions is the basis for understanding the larger 
organizational characteristics of the economy. Institutional 
economics emphasizes the notion that individual actions are to be 
understood by referring to the nature of the societal structures 
and circumstances in which they arise. Boulding’s evolutionary 
theory perspective with its emphasis on learning and changes 
which generate changed circumstances, supports the view that an 
understanding of either societal dynamics or individual action 
requires an understanding of the interactive nature of both.
In this sense, the distinguishing analytic concerns of 
conventional, institutional, and neo-institutional economics 
could result in complementary research programmes designed to 
obtain a better understanding of economic circumstances and 
processes. F'rogress in each of the programmes can provide 
insight into the role of the arts, a "something different" 




























































































welfare, in those processes.
In this context it is good to briefly mention the instruments of 
analysis the social scientist has at his disposal. The range of 
cultural phenomena, the rate of their development, the role of 
the state in cultural development and the overall importance of 
culture to the future of society in relation to social and 
economic development, make a comprehensive information process 
based on actual experience and not on preconceived ideas, 
necessary. Facts and figures obtained by resorting to the social 
sciences might be useful instruments in analysing cultural policy 
if we are aware of the many intangible values attached to 
culture. Facilities and resources need quantification and 
culture does not.
Although this operation may seem essentially philistine and anti- 
cultural , statistics on cultural activities or cultural 
expenditure may provide some indications of a country’s cultural 
potential in a comparative perspective and they may even help to 
understand some trends in cultural development. This information 
may serve decision-makers in the political, economic and cultural 
field.
The comparison of the data available in various countries shows 
that the preparation of a framework for cultural statistics is 
only at an initial stage. Actually, statistical work is carried 



























































































a. The setting-up of a system -for collecting cultural statistics 
(e.g. international or national cultural statistics on public 
reading or on cinema attendance) . Activity/user or 
activity/inhabitant ratios provide a basis -for a comparison 
between countries and may be useful for cultural policy makers.
b. An analysis of financial flows. The most important cultural 
statistics for governments are the financial flows, particularly 
public expenditure at national, regional and local levels, 
household expenditure, public organizations, nonprofit 
institutions and profit-seeking firms.
For the government it is important to obtain a clear idea of how 
public cultural expenditure compares with other sources of funds 
and to ascertain whether or not the final distribution reflects 
the cultural priorities set. The most important indicators 
are the following: the cultural budget of the state as a 
percentage of the total budget and of national income; the total 
national expenditure on culture as a percentage of national 
income; expenditure by the state, regional and local authorities, 
industries, associations and households as percentages of total 
national expenditure on culture; expenditure on different 
activities as percentages of expenditure incurred by the various 
economic agents; the ratio between operating expenses and capital 
investment; the ratio between subsidies and direct expenditure;



























































































c. The statistical study on the professions and occupations 
connected with culture, the number of personnel in each field of 
activity, age pyramids, incomes, opportunities for students from 
specialized schools. Data on professional cultural workers are 
hard to obtain. It is difficult to exactly pin-point who these 
workers are. If governments still have the task to protect the 
artists, occupational statistics might provide information about 
their socio-economic conditions.
II. Support for Culture
1. In the debate over public support for culture, in particular 
for the arts, economists have provided different passible 
rationales to justify government intervention (Blaug 1976; Hendon 
and others 1980; Leroy 1980). The search for a scientific 
justification- of government support to the arts is a challenging 
one in democratic societies, where any redistribution of 
resources solely on grounds of taste is generally considered 
illegitimate. This is especially true when the redistribution 
favours a relatively wealthy and well-educated minority, as is 
the case of the arts. In the economics of arts literature a 
variety of arguments is put forward which are firmly fixed in 
economic analysis and do not involve a departure from democratic 
ideals, although the results are not always satisfactory.
The search for "fresh" justifications of sustaining support to 



























































































-for further growth in public expenditure on culture» An economic 
approach is said to provide value-for—money arguments to the 
decisi on-maker in the general and cultural policy field. In 
general economics literature, two basic grounds can be found for 
government support to unprofitable activities.
The first ground for government intervention in the economy is 
inequality of opportunities. In our economies it is assumed that 
the best allocation of resources is determined by the free 
market. However, it is generally agreed that no market test needs 
to support the flow of public funds intended for the opening-up 
of opportunities for the impecunious. As the market reflects the 
preferences of individuals measured according to their purchases 
which are based on the logic of rational action, the allocation 
of resources is determined by the income distribution. However, 
the affluent consumer has more influence on the course of 
allocation than a purchaser with less financial means. 
Therefore, government funds directly or indirectly intended for 
promoting equality of opportunities are viewed as a means for 
correcting the market mechanism.
A second legitimate ground used to justify government 
expenditures involves the category of commodities and services 
which the economist calls "public goods". The provision of public 
goods cannot be entrusted to market forces only. Although public 
goods cannot pass the market test, it does not follow that the 




























































































cannot be -forced to pay -for them, they may consider them well 
worth their cost. In that a case it is the normal commercial 
mechanism and not the consumer demand which has failed to 
function. Therefore, a government’s decision to supply a public 
good, may be the only way to fulfil the wishes of the consumers. 
Public support is then justified as the only available means to 
make demand effective.
The situation is a bit more complicated in the case of mixed 
goods and services which have characteristics that are partly 
private and partly public, such as education and culture. Unlike 
pure public goods, mixed commodities can be expected to cover 
part of their cost because they are sold to the public. Gne can 
charge a price resulting from the direct benefits which flow from 
the provision of facilities for higher education, health care or 
restauration . of inner-cities. This is possible because the 
consumer can be excluded from the enjoyment Of direct benefits if 
he does not pay the tuition, fee or rent. The consumer cannot, 
however, be excluded from the indirect benefits of mixed 
commodities, since these are inevitably available to all members 
of the community. Therefore, the price of quasi-public goods may 
not be high enough to cover their cost of production. In this 
case, failing the market test does not necessarily imply that 
the goods are not wanted? it merely reflects that commercial 
standards of valuation cannot be applied. Public support may then 



























































































I-f the per-forming arts are mixed commodities which produce
direct benefits for the community as a whole, government support 
of the arts might well be completely consistent with the desires 
of the entire community. We propose to take a look at the 
existing literature in order to assess the validity of arts as 
mixed services. We therefore introduce a conceptual framework for 
examining scientific (economic) explanations of government 
support to the cultural sector, particularly in the light of the 
heterogeneous and ambiguous objective functions of the state.
Two types of rationale for subsidizing cultural expression and 
development can be identified. Arguments of the first type are 
based on grounds extrinsic to these arts per se. The second type 
of arguments attempts to justify subsidies on the basis of the 
intrinsic merits of the arts. It will be argued that neither 
entirely extrinsic nor intrinsic arguments can justify government 
support to the arts. Purely intrinsic arguments embody values 
which conflict with those of a liberal democracy, while purely 





ex i stence 
benef i ts. 
benef i ts
extrinsic arguments refer, either explicitly or 
, to market failure in the technical (Pareto) sense. A 
economists believes that the market mechanism does not 
properly in the case of the arts because of the 
of externalities, i.e. social benefits exceed private 
If one agrees that the performing arts confer general 



























































































that partly,- and perhaps -for a large part, the arts are public 
goods o-F which benefits demonstrably exceed the receipts one can 
hope to collect -from the box office.
Social benefits which are often mentioned in economic literature 
on the arts can be summarized as follows:
- the prestige resulting from cultural activity. The availability 
of fine orchestras, opera houses or ballet groups are a prime 
source of satisfaction, also for persons who themselves have no 
desire to attend cultural events.
- the advantage that the availability of cultural activity 
confers on business, with a possible impact on tourism and 
employment possibilities.
- another type of social contribution made by the performing 
arts involves future generations (cf, preservation of the 
cultural patrimonium, improvement of architecture etc.)
- another type of indirect -benefit provided by the arts is their
educational contribution to the general development of the
community»
The conclusion is rather obvious: the free market will fail to
achieve an efficient allocation of resources in the case of
public or semi-public goods and services, e>:: h ibiti ng
externalities. Support for the arts is therefore justified from 



























































































Apart from the public good argument (i.e. art products are 
marketed in divisible units to buyers but are often consumed 
freely) it is also argued in the literature that art products 
produce another category of externalities which justifies state 
support: development costs of artistic productions are high and 
the artists da not have property rights for the spin-offs of the 
artistic creation. In this respect the degree of excludability is 
rather low (i.e. transiations, variations and other derivatives 
of works of art: popularizing reproductions, the influence of the 
artist on other artists, applications in commercial design; the 
reproductions of views inherent in works of art; social functions 
of the arts). Important in this perspective is the distinction 
between artistic endeavour as the constituting or generating 
public goods and the economic dilemma of artistic organizations 
as explained by Baumol.
At the conceptual level, the requirement for market inefficiency 
as a necessary condition of state intervention is very strong. At 
the operational level, however, it is observed that the state 
often acts' on the basis of criteria other than market failure. In 
other words, the state cannot claim that inefficiency in markets 
for the arts justifies the decision to intervene in these 
markets. It means that market failure arguments alone cannot 
justify subsidies to the arts, although they can provide some 
reason to support the arts. In short, purely extrinsic arguments




























































































because they invoke only general value premises. There is however 
no reason why extrinsic arguments cannot be used in a 
justification as long as they are consistent with other reasons 
put forward.
b. Intrinsic arguments center on the concept of "merit good", a 
quasi-economic concept. The arts are said to be a necessary input 
for the cultural setting of a society. It implies that a society 
having the arts is in some sense qualitatively superior to one 
not having them, and that such quality is an increasing function 
of art supply and consumption.
The reasoning is set in a dynamic perspective. Culture is 
considered both as what a society is from a historical point of 
view and as an actually existing consumption good of society 
determined by the changing societal structures. The link between 
the two expressions of culture is obvious? goods which satisfy a 
demand for consumption represent what a society is. The only 
difference with other consumption goods lies in the time 
perspective.
According to the 7 merit good7 argument the market mechanism does 
not function sufficiently in favour of artistic production (as is 
the case with scientific production). Because the market only 
reflects the consumers7 preferences at a given moment, merit 
wants will not be satisfied. In other words, the appreciation of 




























































































learning process of interaction between cultural producers and 
consumers. This type of argument concerns the education of minors 
and, resulting from this, the satisfaction derived by the present 
community of economic decisi on-makers from conferring benefits on 
the future generations. The logic of this argument is based on 
the hypothesis that a taste for the arts is instilled by early 
experiences.
Government support is then considered as the financing of an 
investment in human capital (cf. analogy between culture and 
education)s investment in culture, not as a response to an 
existing demand but as an anticipation of a possible future 
demand. The creation of this potential demand is dependent on 
existing cultural supply, and therefore the justification for 
government support.
Given necessity of and state responsibility for the quality of 
life, the intrinsic argument is said to be sufficient for state 
intervention in the art markets (assuming that intervention can 
increase art supply and consumption). This conception of state 
support is paternalistic and its effect is a redistribution of 
resources among individuals and groups of individuals on grounds 
of taste.
A second element in the intrinsic argumentation is given by 
Scitovsky. "If anything is wrong with the arts, we should seek 



























































































difficulties of the arts have more to do with the 
consumers’ individual preferences as revealed on the market place 
than with our economy. In his book, "The Joyless Economy: An 
Inquiry into Human Satisfaction and Consumer Dissatisfaction" 
(1976) Tibor Scitovsky argues that narrow individual rationality 
is a major source of the problem and "that the remedy is to move 
to a higher or social rationality...". He further argues that the 
nature of technological advance has been such that the cost of 
producing "novelty and its stimulus" has grown relative to that 
of producing comfort. Moreover, the choice between comfort and 
pleasure is not essentially an economic matter, in spite of the 
budgetary consequences for the individual concerned.
According to Scitovsky none of the (extrinsic) standard arguments 
in favour of government financing is really applicable to the 
arts: the arts are not a collective good which can be provided 
more cheaply and efficiently by government nor are subsidies 
a suitable means to reduce income inequalities.
The only valid argument for government aid to the arts is said to 
be a means of educating the public’s taste. It is assumed that 
the public will benefit from a more educated taste. Cultural 
development and artistic expression need to be favoured for their 
intrinsic characteristics; according to Scitovsky this can only 



























































































Although the socio-economic dimension of the demand is an 
important element in the analysis, supply of as well as demand 
for culture determine the dynamic interplay between (social) 
production and (social) consumption. It is true that our mass 
production society is biased against minority needs and tastes 
and that the enjoyment of the arts has usually been the privilege 
of a small elite. Summurazing, intrinsic arguments provide some 
rationale for the states’ responsibility to provide favourable 
conditions for cultural development, artistic expression and 
their appreciation. This may, however, have some political 
i mpli cations.
c. In short, extrinsic arguments usually fail because some 
rationales apply equally to commodities, other than the arts 
which are not supported by the state, while entirely intrinsic 
arguments fail because they result in dictatorial assertions on 
the quality of various tastes. Therefore, it. seems necessary to 
try to connect a value on the intrinsic desirability of the arts 
with some extrinsic reasons to construct a legitimate 
justification. Only by sharply dividing the why and the how, the 
economist will be able to legitimately engage in prescriptive 
subsidy analysis if and only if the policymakers’ preferences are 
known.
3. Having reviewed the economic explanations for government 



























































































At least according to economic theory, art goods themselves 
are not pure public goods. In policy terms, the conditions of 
supply may be made public, but economic theory is clear on the 
definition of a public good and on the problems of resource 
al1ocati on.
- In economic theory a necessary but insufficient condition for 
pure public good is that it can be consumed jointly. The 
exclusion principle says that the product can be provided in 
separable units to various consumers. Since admission to an 
artistic event can be provided in separable units, the exclusion 
principle is operable in the arts.
- Economic theory clearly states that inefficient allocation of 
resources will exist in the case of a jointly consumed good if a 
free rider (concealed demand) is possible because of the 
exclusion principle or if the suppliers cannot sufficiently meet 
the collective demand in order for the product to be provided 
in sufficient quantities.
- The ’merit good' argument is a political argument, not an 
economic one. Public support to the arts must show that the 
public interest is served directly or that the special interests 
served are accepted as desirable social objectives.
- Market failure applied to the arts is really a J merit good-’ 
arguments demand for arts ought to be greater or supply ought 
to be greater. Actually, in some instances the market is not 



























































































The more definite externalities generated by the arts usually 
flow to special interest groups.
All these conclusions call for an awareness of the limits of a
sci enti f i c approach to culture as wel 1 as -for prudence in the
appiication of economic reasoni ng in a sector characteri zed by
creativity and diversity.
If we leave out purely economic reasoning, we will still be able 
to consider the state as, basically, an agent of regulation and 
reproduction in our Western societies. According to the varying 
economic and political systems the state also intervenes in the 
cultural field. In an analysis of different political traditions 
Chartrand presents an interesting fourfold taxonomy of different 
roles of the state in supporting the nonprofit arts (Chartrand 
and McCaughy 1935). These roles are now converging. It is argued 
that political tradition often plays a more significant role in 
government support to the arts than economic rationality. It 
certainly demonstrates the influence of cultural and political 
differences on the economic (financial) behaviour of the state.
1. In the USA political tradition has led to a separation between 
church and state, to free market competition and to private 
philanthropy. From the American experience, a distinct role in 
art funding can be identified: the "Faci1itator". The government 
funds the arts through tax expenditures made on behalf of 




























































































deductible. The state supports diversity within the nonprofit 
amateur arts and the -fine arts. The status of the artist is 
determined by private donors.
2. In the UK and the Commonwealth, a tradition of constitutional 
monarchy and common law has led the government to distance itself 
from the arts in order to protect them from direct political 
interference. Distancing an activity from political influences 
is the "arm's length principle". It is a general public policy 
principle aiming to avoid undue concentrâtion of power and 
conflict of interests, in both the public and private sector. 
Accordingly, its application to arts funding is only an example 
of a general public policy principle being applied to a specific 
policy issue.
From the British experience, one can identify the second role of 
the state in art funding, the "Patron", which funds the arts 
through arm's length arts councils. The government determines the 
aggregate level of support granted to the arts. The state tends 
to support professional excellence in the nonprofit fine arts. In 
the Patron state the status of the artist is determined by peer 
evaluati on.
3. The Western European tradition of arts 
interventionist, reflecting the role of the 
the absolute monarchs of the 17th until the 
Those monarchs established national artistic
funding has been 
medieval church and 




























































































-From this experience one can identify the third role of the state
in supporting the arts: the "Architect", The government 
arts through a Ministry or Department of Culture, 
decisions are made by bureaucrats. The state supports 
standards in the amateur arts and the fine arts as par 
social welfare policies along with health, education 







of f i ci al
4. The Czarist tradition of autocracy combined with Communist 
ideology has led most Communist countries to fund the arts 
through direct ownership of the artistic means of production. 
From this experience one can identify the fourth role of the 
state in supporting the arts, the "Engineer", which owns all the 
means of artistic production. The state supports political 
standards of excellence and as such does not support the process 
of creativity. Funding decisions are made by political commissars 
to further political education, not artistic excellence. The 
status of the artist is determined by the Party.
We may conclude by positing a permanent government responsibi1ity 
in the culture field. The role of the state must be confined to 
encouraging cultural development by creating favourable 
conditions while safeguarding the freedom of artistic expression. 
In pursuing this, governments can adopt legislation and take 
measures which have an influence on the social and economic 



























































































position of -the artist and safeguarding the freedom of artistic 
expression are reasons which justify legislation in the cultural 
field. The considerable and increasing economic importance of 
culture, the increase in non-working time and the recent trend to 
make culture more marketable, also call for legislation in order 
to safeguard the objective conditions according to which scarce 
resources can be fairly (in the economic sense) allocated among 
all sectors of cultural activity.
III. Organization of the Production and Distribution of Culture
A. Economic explanations of the prevalence of nonprofit cultural 
organizations
1. Serious work on the economics of the nonprofit sector began in 
the early 1970s (Hansmann 1987; Powell 1987; Rose-Ackerman 1936; 
Weisbrod 1977 and 1988). Only since recently has the literature 
on cultural economics dealt with the question of organizational 
structures of the production and distribution of culture, in 
particular the prevalence of nonprofit cultural organizations 
(DiMaggio 1986; DiMaggio 1987; Hansmann 1981).
Broadly speaking, in the past years two formal economic theories 




























































































a. the market fai1 ure/government failure theory
This theory considers the existence of the nonprofit sector as 
the combined product of market failure and government failure, 
i.e. of inherent limitations in both the private market and 
government as providers of collective goods (Weisbrod 1977). 
Collective goods are products or services which, once they are 
produced, are enjoyed by all people whether they have paid for 
them or not. Providing such goods exclusively through the market 
will ensure that there is only a small supply of them since few 
consumers will volunteer to pay for products they could enjoy 
without having to pay. With the market demand being low, 
producers will produce less of these goods or services than the 
public really needs or wants. This problem is commonly referred 
to as the "free rider" problem, and in traditional economic 
theory it serves as the major rationale for government 
intervention. Since government can tax people for producing 
collective goods, it can overcome this market failure.
However, the government, too, has certain inherent limitations as 
producer of collective goods. It is most important to consider 
that in a democratic society it will produce only that range and 
quantity of collective goods having a majority support. This will 
of course lead to some demands not being met. A nonprofit sector 
is needed to meet such demands for collective goods. So, 
according to the theory nonprofit organizations exist to supply a 



























































































nonprofit organizationsnot by a majority. In other words, 
provide collective goods and are financed by voluntary donations 
from people dissatisfied with low levels of government activity. 
As a result the more diverse the community is, the more extensive 
the nonprofit sector it is likely to have, will be.
b. The contract failure theory
The second broad theory of the nonprofit sector attributes the 
existence of nonprofit organizations to a different kind of 
market failure, i.e. contract failure and information assymetrics 
(Hansmann 1981 and 1987). This theory emphasizes the tasks which 
nonprofit organizations perform better than profit-seeking firms.
The central notion here 
services, the purchaser 
In these circumstances, 
which involve consumer 
information, do not apply
is that in the case of 
is not the same person 
the normal mechanisms 
choice on the basi
some goods and 
as the consumer, 
of the market, 
s of adequate
Nonprofit organizations will emerge in situations 
consumers feel unable to accurately evaluate the quanti 
quality of the product or service. On account of the di 
constraint (i.e. it prohibits the distribution of 
earnings to persons who exercise control over the firm) 
profit organization offers the consumers the advantag 
provision of higher quality services.
wh ere the
ty and the






























































































Nonprof i t organizations
economi c characteri sti cs:
return on invested capital
purpose. These two featur
significant point is that 
organization are by their 
the organization on the br 
a group the quality of th 
end in itself»
36
as a group share at least two basic 
1 » they do not obtain any pecuniary 
and 2 « they claim to serve some social 
es are not completely independent. The 
the objectives of the typical nonprofit 
very nature designed to constantly keep 
ink of financial catastrophe; for such 
e services which it provides becomes an
Nor only through its quality aspirations do the social goals of 
the nonprofit enterprise contribute to its financial situation. 
The concern of the typical nonprofit organization for the extent 
and composition of its clientele often causes operating revenue 
to be lower than if services would be priced to achieve a simple 
profit-maximization goal. In short, a low price for the product 
of a nonprofit group is normally an inevitable consequence of its 
objectives.
The desire, to provide a product of as high a quality as possible 
and to distribute the product in a manner other than that 
maxmizing revenue, creates another unusual situation. For such an 
enterprise a substantial increase in the demand for its product 
may well worsen the organization’s financial health.
2. It is apparent that all of the standard problems of nonprofit 



























































































performing arts, including or 
ballet, are -for a great 
institutions. However, at th 
segments o-f the per-forming art 
some sectors o-f the musi 
proprietary; book publishing i
chestral music, opera, theatre and 
part the product o-f nonprofit 
e same time, there are still some 
s that are strongly profit-seeking: 
c industry are almost entirely 
s predominantly proprietary, etc.
From the data we may conclude that the relative importance of the 
nonprofit form varies less between the artistic media (visual, 
musical, dramatic) or organizational functions than within them.
Host arts industries perform both profit-seeking and nonprofit 
activities: scholarly and poetry presses in the book publishing 
sector, classical music producers in the music industry, museums 
and commercial art galleries in visual arts. It should not be 
forgotten that in the past, profit-seeking institutions were a 
rule rather than an exception in the performing arts; usually, 
not only serious theatre but even symphony orchestras were 
proprietary. The dominance of nonprofit institutions in the 
cultural sector is largely the product of recent decades.
This leads us to 
hypotheses:
1. Labour-intensive 
the nonprofit form, 
more often organized
an inductive summary with three working
cultural activities tend to be organized in 
whereas those that are capital-intensive are 



























































































2. Cultural activities associated with high—art -forms tend to be 
organized in the nonprofit form, whereas those that are 
associated with popular culture are more likely to be organized 
on a proprietary basis. The high-art forms are particularly 
1 abour-intensive, relatively unlikely to use media technologies 
for distribution, and thus unable to realize substantial 
economies of scale.
3. Within the non-commercial sectors, cultural activities which 
serve large publics or which are closely linked to the official 
aims of public education, tend to be organized as public 
agencies, particularly libraries and history museums, whereas 
activities with smaller audiences or less clearly educational 
purposes tend to be organized as nonprofit agencies.
In the following we review the main economic approaches 
explaining the organizational structure of the production and 
distribution of culture.
- Baumol’s cost disease
The conventional explanation for the- prevalence of non- 
proprietary organizations in the cultural field is that there are 
no profits to be made. Baumol analyzes the prospective 
developments on the cost side by looking at the implications of 
differential rates of growth in productivity within the economy. 
In an economy divided into two sectors, one in which productivity 
is rising and another where productivity is stable, it is 




























































































productivity sector of the economy.
According to the classic exposition of this view (Baumol and 
Bowen 1966), the arts are a service industry and, as such, are 
highly 1abour-intensive. In contrast to the situation of 
manufacturing firms, which can increase productivity by 
implementing technical innovations, productivity increases in the 
field of arts are limited. The theatre, symphony orchestra, 
chamber group, opera, dance, all can serve as textbook 
illustrations of activities offering little opportunity for major 
technological change.
Cultural organizations operate in an economy having a large 
manufacturing sector. As productivity in manufacturing rises 
on account of improvements in production efficiency,
manufacturing wages increase. Because arts and other service­
providing organizations compete for labour with manufacturing 
firms, non-manufacturing wages are also levelled up. As a 
consequence, increasing wages cause the production costs of art 
organizations to spiral beyond what the organization can hope tof 
earn. Therefore live performing arts organizations require 
increasing support. In other words, arts suffer from a cost 
disease on account of which they require ever-increasing 
quantities of subsidy. Even an increased number of orchestral 
performances may augment the size of the contributions required 
for solvency. Summarizing, Baumol’ 5 cost disease analysis 




























































































of production and distribution of culture.
In most of the European countries dates and results have 
confirmed the thesis of Baumol. The hypothesis of the rapid 
increase in the costs of live performance as well as the 
incapacity of the cultural organizations to reduce the income gap 
by increasing prices or by conducting a more aggressive 
commercial policy, have been verified.
Performing arts organizations can reduce the rate of increase in 
their production costs by permitting some deterioration in the 
quality of their product, by having fewer rehearsals, by using 
less well-trained performers, and by using costumes and scenery 
of a lower quality. But such a course is never popular with 
organizations dedicated to quality, and, furthermore, it may lead 
to loss of audience and community support.
There is one other important way for performing arts to save 
costs, i.e. through the wages paid to performers. The live 
performing arts form a rather special labour market, i.e. a 
market in which the need for great natural ability and extensive 
training limits the supply, but in which the non-economic returns 
offer substantial inducement to remain in the field. In other 
words, the performing arts are relatively insensitive to general 




























































































It is mainly- for this reason that performing arts organizations 
in financial difficulty have often managed to shift part of their 
financial burden back to the performers and the management, who 
are usually very poorly paid according to commercial standards. 
An explaination frequently given for this refers to the 
willingness of those working in these fields to sacrifice money 
income for the less material pleasures of their participation in 
the arts. Although there are limits to these financial 
sacrifices, excess supply continues to be one of the market’s 
most notable characteristics. The tendency of increases in prices 
to lag behind increases in costs simply means that arts 
organizations have had to raise larger and larger sums from their 
contributors. It is therefore not surprising that the survival of 
the wide majority of performing arts organizations requires a 
constant flow of financial contributions.
- Hansmann’s voluntary price discrimination
Nearly all nonprofit performing arts groups are for a large 
part dependent on donations. This pattern of financing provides a 
preliminary explanation for the predominance of the nonprofit 
form in the cultural field. But why are the performing arts to 
such a great extent financed by donations?
In other sectors (e.g. education, health) such donative financing 
for nonprofits sometimes serves as a means to support the private 




























































































has been -frequently argued that the performing arts exhibit 
substantial beneficial externalities which in turn provide a 
rationale for both public and private subsidies (cf. part II). 
However, it does not appear that such external benefits are a 
major stimulus for the donations received by the performing arts 
groups. Indeed, the evidence proves quite the opposite, for it 
appears that most donations received by performing arts 
organizations come from people who actually attend the 
groups’ performances.
Another explanation commonly given is that donations are a 
private subsidy which makes it possible to keep ticket prices at 
low levels so that they can be purchased by people who otherwise 
could not afford them. Yet the vast majority of people attending 
the performing arts are quite well off. Surely, it is doubtful 
that the performing arts are organized on a nonprofit basis 
primarily to provide a way for the rich to subsidize the merely 
prosperous.
The situation seems rather paradoxical. We have a service, 
which is basically private, financed partly by donations and 
partly by revenue from ticket sales. Organizations such as 
orchestras and resident theatres do not produce primarily public 
or collective goods: the vast majority of benefits accrues to the 
purchasers of tickets. Yet, the people who donate are also the 




























































































seem to reflect costs. Hansmann explains the reliance of 
nonprofit performing arts organisations on donations as a form of 
voluntary price discrimination according to which some consumers 
agree to pay more than others for the same service (Hansmann 
1981).
Hansmann attributes this arrangement to the price structure of 
performing arts production. The considerable costs of organizing, 
directing, rehearsing and providing scenery and costumes for a 
performing arts production are basically fixed costs, unrelated 
to the size of the audience. These costs represent a high 
percentage of the total costs of any presentation; the marginal 
costs of providing an extra performance or of accommodating an 
additional consumer are relatively low. Consumer costs must be 
high enough to cover the total costs of production but low enough 
to realistically reflect the marginal costs of an additional 
performance or audience member. As demand for the arts is 
limited, however, quantity cannot be increased up to the point 
where, fixed costs are covered. In economic terms, the demand 
curve lies below the cost curve at any given price.
So, to survive, the performing arts organization must set prices 
to extract from each consumer the value the performance holds for 
him or her. Selling different quality seats at different prices 
is one means to accomplish this, but there is a limit to the 
degree of differentiation in seat qualities and the strategy




























































































also set an unusually high value,on good seats. Consequently, 
orchestras and theatre companies ask -for voluntary donations as a 
means of discriminating with respect to price.
Hansmann’s analysis also helps to explain why through the years 
nonprofit organizations have become increasingly prominent in the 
performing arts. Because productivity in live performances has 
not grown at the same pace as productivity in the overall 
economy, the costs of performing arts productions have increased 
disproportionately to that of most other goods. From historical 
evidence it appears that fixed costs have consistently risen at a 
faster rate than variable costs have, and have thus started to 
represent an increasingly large share of total costs. These 
developments have presumably given nonprofit organizations, 
having access to the means of price discrimination, an increasing 
advantage over their profit-seeking counterparts which are 
dependent upon ticket sales alone to cover both fixed and 
variable costs.
Summarizing, the life performing arts are commonly characterized 
by fixed costs that are relative high in relation to marginal 
costs, and by a relatively low overall demand. As a consequence, 
performing arts groups must often engage in price discrimination 
if they wish to survive without subsidy. However, the 
opportunities in the field of effective discrimination through 
ticket pricing are limited. Therefore, nonprofit firms, which 




























































































discriminatioh, can often survive in areas of the performing arts 
where profit-seeking firms cannot.
- Weisbrod public goods’ theory
We have no explicit economic theories on the relative prevalence 
of public and nonprofit culture producers and distributors among 
non-commercial culture producers and distributors. But the more 
general framework of Weisbrod public goad’s theory can be 
extended to the arts (Weisbrod 1977, Weisbrod 1988). The model 
concentrates on voluntary provision as a response to government 
failure. He suggested that nonprofit organizations serve as 
private producers of public goods and that they are financed by 
voluntary donations from people dissatisfied with low levels of 
government activity.
According to Weisbrod, non-commercial organizations exist to 
provide "collective consumption goods", i.e. goods with benefits 
that cannot be only limited to those who pay for them. In line 
with the public choice tradition, according to which the
political system is assumed to translate voter/consumer
preferences into public policy, public enterprise arises when 
voters agree about the desirability of a collective good and the 
amount to be provided. Under these circumstances the ability of 
government to tax (and thus circumvent the free-rider problem) 



























































































However, demand -for collective goods often varies strongly from 
person to person. Weisbrod argues that when this occurs, 
governmental organizations will tend to provide public goods only 
at that level that satisfies the average voter; consequently 
there will be some residual unsatisfied demand for public goods 
among those individuals whose taste for such goods is larger than 
that of the average individual. Citizens who prefer a higher 
level of provision of such a good might therefore set up a 
private voluntary organization to supplement the government’s 
production. In other words, nonprofit organizations emerge to 
meet this residual demand by providing public goods in amounts 
supplementing those provided by government. In short, Weisbrod 
anticipates that nonprofit organizations will be the first 
providers, followed by government, of any given collective good, 
which will grow until consumers become wealthy enough to replace 
collective goods with privately consumable substitutes. For any 
given good, demand develops gradually, at different rates for 
different people.
Applied to some specific cultural fields (libraries, museums) 
Weisbrod’s arguments provide some explanatory leverage. Still, 
there is much more that the Weisbrod approach does not explain. 
The performing arts are mostly consumed privately by the same 
people who donate to the organizations of which they purchase 
tickets. This economic model cannot explain why nonprofit 




























































































stated that the larger the private goods component in a "mixed 
good", the greater the tendency for the profit-seeking 
organization to supplement governmental provision» In short, 
refined empirical research is required to verify the ability of 
the public goods' theory to explain the specific characteristics 
of organizational structures in the cultural field.
- Conclusion
The economic approaches explain the relative prevalence of 
different organizational forms in the production and distribution j 
of culture. The Hansmann and Baumol approaches explain the j 
preponderance of nonprofit enterprise in the production and j 
distribution of art forms that are labour-intensive and to the j 
extent that labour-intensiveness is especially characteristic of 
the high arts, they help to explain the importance of nonprofit j 
firms in these fields. The Weisbrod theory explains the relative 
dominance of public enterprise in the provision of services j 
(libraries or history museums) having large collective 
consumption components.
11The application of the economic approaches to culture leads to j 
problems in at least three overlapping areas:
1. If the arts are different from other commodities and services,
■how do they differ and what is the appropriate way to consider 




























































































2. There are problems in 'identifying, measuring and determining 
the relationships between important variables. Of course;, these 
are problems inherent in economic analysis, but in the case o-f 
the arts less background work and less useful data exist than ^n 
the case of many other applied areas of analysis.
3. There is an area of problems associated with decision criteria 
and decision-making arrangements for optimal social welfare. This 
area includes the well-known problems of welfare theory, such as 
indeterminacy of optimal choice in plausible collective decision 
situations, public goods, and differences between private 
benefits and costs, and social ones? it also includes problems 
posed by matters beyond the scope of conventional economics, in 
particular taste and preference formation and the possible 
relevance of the concept of merit goods in the case of the arts. 
This requires the introduction of unconventional perspectives.
B. Economic Approaches to Behavioural Differences
1. Economists have quite successfully modelled the behaviour of 
proprietary firms by assuming that owners and their agents seek 
to maximize profits and have sufficient information on and 
control over other participants for the firm to behave in a 
profit-maximizing manner. Therefore, it has been natural for 
economic models of nonprofit firms, including cultural 
organizations, to start making certain assumptions about the 
goals, or objective functions, of these organizations and to 




























































































behaviour (Hendon 2< others 1980; Hendon & Shanahan 1933).
Presumably profit maximization is excluded as objective -for any 
legitimate nonprofit organization; consequently, the organization 
must select other goals. This choice of goals may lie with one or 
several individuals or groups, including performers, directors, 
producers, professional managers and donors. The difference 
between nonprofit cultural organizations and their proprietary 
counterparts does not lie in the "typical" objectives of the 
former but in the tendency of nonprofit objective functions to be 
more heterogeneous and more ambiguous than those of the profit 
maximizing firm.
Nearly all economic models have stated that nonprofit cultural 
organizations try to maximize two goals, i.e. artistic quality 
and size o-f the audience (Baumol and Bowen 1966; Hansmann 19815 
Mqntias 1983;; Throsby and Withers 1979). The models then attempt 
to predict the behaviour o-f nonprofit firms by analyzing how a 
joint quality and audience maximizer would behave under the 
constraints to which cultural organizations are subject; or they 
consider the welfare consequences of pursuing different 
objectives which are consistent with the nonprofit status.
A central focus of such models has 
quality and quantity. In general, 
quality-maximizing culture producer 
or fewer performances than either
been the trade-off 
economists agree 
will have smaller 































































































profit or the proprietary profit-seeking maximizer, and that the 
audience-maximizing nonprofit arts will have lower ticket prices 
and more performances than either the quality maximizer or the 
profit-seeking cultural firm. Still most cultural economists are 
very sceptical about such an approach because of the presence of 
a variety of additional objectives likely to influence the 
behaviour of nonprofit cultural organizations.
2. Variety of objectives
Because of the centrality of objectives in economic models, it 
may be useful to briefly consider the main goals of nonprofit 
arts organizations, confronting the economists’ assumptions about 
these goals with evidence from case studies.
- quality
Economists have made a distinction between two kinds of artistic 
quality, i.e. innovation and production values. Nonprofit
cultural organizations will attempt to maximize quality in one 
sense or in both senses. Concerning the quality objective there 
are also differences among organizationally employed artists, 
often depending on the size of the organizations. Moreover, if we 
consider boards of trustees as the ultimate decision-making 
authorities (as, in fact, the law requires) in the nonprofit 
field, the goals of trustees are the dominant factors in 



























































































A variety of case studies suggests that many boards of trustees 
may actually play a negative role in artistic quality. In fact, 
arts organisations vary as regards the objectives of their 
boards, their managers and their artistic directors as well as in 
the power that each of these holds in relation to the others. 
There is some evidence that resident theatres, at least, prefer 
innovative repertoire.
- Size of the audience
With a few exceptions, most economists have assumed that 
nonprofit arts, providers prefer large audiences not simply for 
fiscal rerasons but as ends in themselves, and that consequently 
they set ticket prices lower and provide more performances than 
an optimizing proprietary firm would. A number of economists 
also assumes that arts organizations seek a broad and socially 
heterogeneous audience.
In fact, little evidence supports this view, and considerable 
evidence suggests that most decisi on-makers in nonprofit arts 
organizations have a more complex and often ambivalent attitude 
toward their audiences. This ambivalence can be seen most clearly 
among trustees, the policy-makers of the nonprofit firm.
- Survival and legitimacy
Economists have assumed that the nonprofit arts organizations 
attempt to survive; still, they paid little attention to the 



























































































especially the importance o-f or gani zati onal legitimacy.
By contrast, case studies of nonprofit arts organizations stress 
the efforts of their managers to establish the organizations as 
legitimate institutions within the local cultural community.
3. Stability of objective functions.
There is also some evidence that the objective functions of 
individual arts organizations are not always stable and that they 
even change in the course of the life cycle of the nonprofit 
cultural organization. In the short run, arts managers, like 
managers of other organizations, switch their attention from goal 
to goal as various problems arise. Moreover, large arts 
organizations avoid explicit trade-offs between objectives by 
conferring responsibility for different goals on different 
subunits.
In museums, for example, directors may seek to maximize the 
museum's adherence to standards promoted by the museum 
profession, curators may do this with respect to the historical 
value of exhibits, membership staff with respect to the number of 
popular exhibitions, and educators with respect to the museum7s 
commitment to public service.
4. Ambiguity of objective functions
The objectives of 
be ambiguous as
nonprofit cultural organizations are likely to 



























































































extent major decisions by such organizations can best be 
described as goal-directed. Moreover, official goals are so 
abstract as to answer to any number of i nterpretations. Indeed, 
the ambiguity of goals permits participants with widely differing 
interpretations to coexist peacefully in the same organizations, 
although they cause characteristic tensions within the 
organi zati on.
Conclusion
The difference between nonprofit cultural organizations and their 
proprietary counterparts does not lie in the "typical" objectives 
of the former but in the tendency of nonprofit objective 
functions to be more heterogeneous and more ambiguous than those 
of the profit—maximizing firm.
The implications of these behavioural differences between non­
profit and profit-seeking organizations for future research can 
be summarized as follows:
- Attempts to develop one single best objective-function-based 
model of the behaviour of nonprofit performing arts organizations 
are not fruitful;
- nonprofit cultural organizations display a larger heterogeneity 
of goals;
- nonprofit cultural organizations also display more ambiguity in 
their objectives with obvious consequences for the internal 



























































































Case studies on nonprofit cultural organizations suggest four 
major factors influencing the objectives such organizations 
pursues
1= Size and market orientations Large organ!z.ations tend to be 
averse to risks: they have high fixed costs, with respect both to 
salaries and maintenance of the actual plant» Organizations that 
depend on high levels of earned income are similarly averse to 
risks»
2. Class versus public sponsorships The level of education and 
audience diversity as goals are likely to vary according to 
the extent to which the governance of an arts organization is 
dominated by members of cohesive local upper classes and the 
extent to which the organization depends upon the public sector 
for sponsorship, legitimacy or financial support»
3. Roles and relative influence of artistic staff and 
trusteess I .already mentioned the tendency of different goals to 
be conferred to specialized subunits of cultural organizations. 
Perhaps the most important distinction is the one between 
cultural organizations dominated by their artistic staff and 
those which are influenced for the greatest part by trustees. 
Artistic directors and staff are most likely to emphasize quality 
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